Amending the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure by Orfield, Lester B.
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 24 | Issue 3 Article 2
5-1-1949
Amending the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
Lester B. Orfield
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lester B. Orfield, Amending the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 24 Notre Dame L. Rev. 315 (1949).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol24/iss3/2
AMENDING THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDUREt
The Advisory Committee which drafted the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure had its last meeting in June 1944.
The Rules went into effect in February' and March 2 of
1946, and thus are now three years old. In 1947 the
Department of Justice formally suggested to the Supreme
Court that Rules 5 (a) and 17 (d) be amended. The Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, one of the chief sources of the
Criminal Rules, were materially amended in 1948. Titles
18 and 28 of the United States Code were also revised and
brought up to date in 1948. The Judicial Conferences of the
Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits discussed the Rules and
possible amendments in 1948.
The procedure of amendment as to the Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure is obviously of great relevance. The Advisory Com-
mittee on Rules of Civil Procedure did not assume the initi-
ative as to proposal of amendments, and proceeded to recom-
mend amendments only after being asked by the Supreme
Court.3 However, in its Preliminary Draft of 1936, the
Committee set up a rule for a continuing committee; and
in its Report of 1937, while it did not recommend the specific
rule, it referred to it as being desirable. On recommendation
of its Standing Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Re-
form ' the American Bar Association, in 1942, adopted a
t Address before the Crimes Round Table of the Association of American
Law Schools at Cincinnati, Ohio, December 28, 1948. Professor Orfield was also
a member of the Council of the Crimes Round Table.
1 Rules 32-39, dealing with sentence, judgment and appeal, were placed into
effect by a court order of February 8, 1946. 327 U.S. 825, 66 S.Ct. CLXXVII.
2 The remaining rules went into effect on March 26, 1946, following inaction
by Congress.
S That the Advisory Committee should be active rather than passive is sug-
gested by James W. Moore, Moore, The Supreme Court: 1940-1941 Terms-The
Supreme Couirt and Judicial Administration, 28 VA. L. REv. 861, 903-906; Charles E.
Clark, Jr., The Proper Functioning of the Supreme Court's Federal Rules Com-
mittee, 28 A.B.A.J. 521 (1942).
4 The report is set out in 67 A.B.A. RFP. 200, 201-202 (1942).
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favorable resolution.' In 1942 the Supreme Court recon-
stituted the Committee to consider the recommendation of
amendments.'
Federal Judge Charles E. Clark, Reporter of the Civil
Rules Advisory Committee, has suggested four activities in
which an advisory committee of a continuing character may
engage:
... the correction of any mistakes of draftsmanship which
may have crept into the rules; the clarification of policy as
to rules which may have appeared as ambiguous, at least to
some courts; the review in the light of experience of some of
the choices of policy originally made; and the consideration
of provisions to cover some matters outside the scope of the
present rules. 7
There can be little doubt that such an approach must ulti-
mately involve amendment of the present Criminal Rules.
As to the proper time interval after adoption before
amendments should be considered, the experience of the
Civil Rules Committee is also helpful. The Civil Rules went
into effect in September, 1938. Only a year later in Novem-
ber, 1939, the Court asked the Committee to submit amend-
ments.8 In its report the Court on December 28, 1939,
adopted a limited amendment making clear the applicability
of the Rules to review proceedings of the Longshoreman's
and Harbor Workers' compensation orders.9 This' would
5 "RESOLVED, That the continuing advisory Committee on Rules of Civil
Procedure for the District Courts of the United States, created by Supreme Court
Order of January 5, 1942, should periodically survey the functioning of the Fed-
eral Rules; to that end should invite suggestions and criticisms from the American
Bench and Bar, meet at least annually to consider the functioning of the Federal
Rules and to determine whether amendments are desirable, and make a formal
report to the Court at the opening of each term of the Court (or at such other
time as the Court may direct) of the results of its survey, together with amend-
ments, if any, recommended by it." It is set out in 67 A.B.A. REP. 131 (1942).
6 314 U.S. 720, 62 S.Ct. CLXXIV, 86 L.Ed. 1786, App. XI (1942). See
Charles E. Clark, J., The Influence of Federal Procedural Reform, 13 L. A
CoxTmp. PROB. 144, 150-151 (1948).
7 Charles E. Clark, J., The Proper Function of the Supreme Court's Federao
Rides Committee, 28 A.B.AJ. 521, 522 (1942).
8 308 U.S. 641, 60 S.Ct. CLV, 84 L.Ed. 1424, App. V (1939).
9 308 U.S. 642, 60 S.Ct. CLIX, 84 L.Ed. 1427, App. XIII (1939).
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seem to establish a precedent for the authority and the pro-
cedure to amend."0 The Committee was again invited to
submit amendments by an order of January 5, 1942.11 It
was at that time, almost four years after the adoption of
the Rules, that the Committee began seriously to meet and
consider amendments.
There is precedent even more closely in point. Pursuant
to the Act of February 24, 1933, as amended March 8, 1934,
the Supreme Court on May 7, 1934, promulgated the Fed-
eral Criminal Appeals Rules governing appeals after pleas
of guilty, verdict or finding of guilt.'2 It is significant that
these rules were amended several times. The first amend-
ment came three years after the promulgation of the original
rules,'" the second, four years later,14 the fifth, six years
later,15 and the sixth, seven years later.'" It should not be
forgotten that the Supreme Court, by an order of November
17, 1941, authorized and directed the Advisory Committee
to make such recommendations as might be deemed advis-
able with respect to amendments to the Criminal Appeals
Rules. 7 As one authority stated within a year after the
l0 Charles E. Clark, J., The Influence of Federal Procedural Reform, 13 L.
AND CONTEMP. PROB. 144, 150-151 (1948).
11 314 U.S. 720, 62 S.Ct. CLXXIV, 86 L.Ed. 1786, App. XI (1942).
112 292 U.S. 661, 54 S.Ct. XXXVII, 78 L.Ed. 1512, App. IV (1934). TIhe
Court was assisted by the Solicitor General instead of by an advisory committee.
See Orfield, The Federal Criminal Appeals Rules as Interpreted in the Decisions,
21 N.C.L. REv. 28 (1942).
1s 301 U.S. 717, 57 S.Ct. LXII, 81 L.Ed. 1373, App. X (1937). The follow-
ing sentence was added to Rule 1: "The judgment setting forth the sentence shall
be signed by the judge who imposes the sentence and shall be entered by the
Clerk."
14 304 U.S. 592, 58 S.Ct. CXXVII, 82 L.Ed. 1561, App. XXI (1938). Rule
II (3) was amended so as to add at the beginning of the paragraph: "Except
in capital cases" and to add to the end of the paragraph: "In capital cases the
motion may be made at any time before execution of the judgment." The sub-ject of the rule was motion for new trial solely on the ground of newly dis-
covered evidence.
15 311 U.S. 731, 61 S.Ct. CLII, 85 L.Ed. 1555, App. H (1940). Rule V as
to supersedeas was amended so as to spell out a rule in considerable detail.
16 312 U.S. 721, 61 S.Ct. CLIII, 85 L.Ed. 1560, App. X (1941). The Rules
were made applicable to the federal territorial courts.
17 314 U.S. 719, 62 S.Ct. CLXXIV, 86 L.Ed. 1784, App. VII (1941). I sug-
gested several changes in the Criminal Appeals Rules, some of which eventually
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Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure went into effect: "It
may as well be admitted that the Rules will eventually re-
quire some revision." 18
Proposals by Department of Justice
Prior to December 10, 1948, only two proposed amend-
ments to the Rules had been formally presented to the
Supreme Court. 9 Both of these were proposed by the
Criminal Division of the Department of Justice. The Su-
preme Court has not in any way indicated its disposition as
to them. One amendment seeks to revise Rule 5 (a) to
eliminate doubt as to whether the officer who makes an
arrest must personally take the defendant before the nearest
available commissioner, or may instead turn him over to a
marshal to do so. It is thought that to require F.B.I. agents
to spend valuable time travelling in pairs to transport prison-
ers is inefficient, and is work which the marshals should
perform.
The other proposed amendment would amend Rule 17 (d)
so as to relieve the United States of the requirement of
tendering attendance and mileage fees to witnesses sub-
poenaed in its behalf. This would accord with the Report
of the Advisory Committee which was, however, rejected by
the Supreme Court. The present rule seems to require that
each deputy United States marshal be authorized to carry
several hundreds of dollars of cash at all times. Perhaps
this problem is solved by a provision of the new Judicial
were adopted. See my article, Orfield, Improving Procedure on Judgment and
Appeal in Federal Criminal Cases, 27 MiNw. L. REv. 169, 2 F.R.D. 573 (1943).
The Committee also had authority to recommend amendments to the Petty
Offenses Rules set out in 311 U.S. 733, 61 S.Ct. CLV, 85 L.Ed. 1556, App. IM
(1940), though it did not exercise such authority, largely due to their recency.
18 Fred E. Strine, The New Federal Criminal Rules in Action, 8 FED. B. J.
190 (January 1947). Mr. Strine was a research assistant to the Advisory Com-
mittee, and later came into close contact with the application of the Rules while
serving in the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice.
'9 Orfield, Two Years of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 21
Tama'.a L. Q. 299, 303, 320 (1948). I am indebted for this information to Leland
L. Tolman of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.
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Code."° Section 1825 of Revised Title 28 reads in part as
follows: "Fees and mileage need not be tendered to the
witness upon service of a subpoena issued in behalf of the
United States or an officer or agency thereof." 2 This spe-
cific provision should create an exception for government
witnesses in Rule 17 (d) the same as in Civil Rule 45 (c).22
Integration with the Amended Civil Rules
In the past year the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
were amended to a considerable extent.2" The amended
Civil Rules of significance for criminal procedure are: 6 (b)
and (c), 28 (a), 45 (d) (2), 52 (a), 60 (a), 73, 75 and 84.
The Criminal Rules which might be affected are: 15 (d), 24
17 (f) (2),25 23 (c), 26 36,27 39,28 45 (b) and (c) 9 and
58.30
20 28 U.S.C. as revised by Public Law 733, ch. 646, 80th Congress 2d Sess.
(1948), 28 U.S.C. et seq., 1 U. S. CoDE CONG. SERV. A3 et seq. (1948).
21 The reviser's note explanatory of this provision (Report of the Comrmttee
on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, on H.R. 3214, H.R. REP. No. 308,
80th Cong. 2d Sess. (1948), U. S. CODE CONG. SERV. (Unbound Title 28, Appendix)
1879 (1948).
"The second paragraph is new. It conforms to Rule 4S (e) of the Federal
"Rules of Civil Procedure but is inconsistent with Rule 17 (d) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure and supersedes that rule as to Federal criminal
cases. The Department of justice suggests that RulM 17 (d) is unworkable. To
attempt compliance each deputy marshal serving process must carry, on the
average, $500 in cash on trips to serve process.
"The marshal must advance money from his personal funds. The Comptroller
General has not been able to set up any procedure to make it feasible to advance
fees to government witnesses.
"If a witness is served but fails to appear, the marshal is out of pocket the
money advanced and has no recourse. In the exceptional cases of real necessity,
the marshal supplies transportation to an indigent witness under established regu-
lations which protect the disbursement."
22 It seems to me that this is true in spite of the provision that was added
by the Senate to revise Title 18 of the United States Code, which was enacted
at the same time as Title 28. That provision, as enacted by Public Law 772,
ch. 645, 80th Congress 2d Sess. (1948), is set out in 18 U.S.C. 3771, 1 U. S.
CODE CONG. Sxav. A540 (1948).
23 They are set out in 6 F.R.D. 229 (1947). The Report of the Advisory
Committee and the explanatory notes of the Committee appear in 5 F.R.D. 433
(1946). See also Albert A. Ridge, J., Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 7 Mo. BJ. 131 (1948).
24 Compare Civil Rule 28 (a).
25 Compare Civil Rule 45 d) (2).
26 Compare Civil Rule 52 (a).
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Some of the Criminal Rules refer to the Civil Rules as
their bases. The question naturally arises whether the
amended Civil Rules automatically change the Criminal
Rules so referring.""
No categorical answer may be given. There are three
possible answers: (1) that all the Criminal rules involved
are automatically changed; (2) that none of them is
changed; and (3) that some are changed while others are
not.
A possible approach is as follows: When the Criminal
Rules refer generally to the Civil Rules, the Criminal Rules
are automatically changed, otherwise not. For example,
Criminal Rule 39 (b) (1) refers generally to the Civil
Rules "' and should therefore include them in their present
amended state. On the other hand Criminal Rule 39 (b) (2)
is a special rule for the use of the typewritten record, which
would cast in doubt the applicability of the present new Civil
Rule 75 (o), providing for appeal on the original papers sent
up from the district court.31a
Careful study will be necessary to achieve full integration
of the two sets of rules."2 In some cases there may be need
of integration even as to Rules of Civil Procedure which
have not been amended. Reference has already been made
27 Compare Civil Rule 60 (a).
28 Compare Civil Rules 73 and 75. Criminal Rule 37 may also be affected.
29 Compare Civil Rules 6 (b) and (c).
30 Compare Civil Rule 84.
3oa That there is no automatic change seems suggested in Rule 35 of the
Tenth Circuit Rules, 170 F. (2d) XXIV (1948).
31 "Preparation and Form. The rules and practices governing the preparation
and form of the record on appeal in civil actions shall apply to the record on
appeal in all criminal proceedings, except as otherwise provided in these rules."
Similarly Criminal Rule 15 (d) provides:
"A deposition shall be taken in the manner provided in civil actions. The
court at the request of a defendant may direct that a deposition be taken on
written interrogatories in the manner provided in civil actions."
31a Compare 32 J. Am. JuD. Soc. 118 (1948).
32 I am indebted to Federal Circuit judge Charles E. Clark for letters of
April 21 and May 10, 1948, suggesting prompt action to secure the removal of
the ambiguities which have arisen.
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as to the relation between Criminal Rule 39 (b) (2) and
Civil Rule 75 (o). Another problem arises with respect to
Criminal Rule 39 (c). Clerks of the circuit courts of appeals
are still charging the docket fee as of old when the notice of
appeal is sent up from the district court, and not when the
record is filed as it properly should be. Civil Rule 73 (g)
provides for filing the record and docketing the appeal within
forty days from the date of the notice of appeal; and other
provisions tie the docketing down to the filing of the record;
for example, 75 (j), providing for a skeleton record by
appellee for motions to dismiss and other purposes. The con-
clusion that not until the record is filed is a civil appeal to
be docketed seems to be accepted by almost all the clerks
except in the third circuit, where the fee is claimed from
counsel on receipt of notice of appeal.
Criminal Rule 39 (c)" has the same provision as to filing
the record and docketing within forty days, and the note to
the rule states that the rule changes the existing practice by
prescribing the same procedure as in the Civil Rules. It
therefore seems a fair conclusion that the rule above stated
applies in criminal appeals also. Yet only the clerks in the
second circuit agree. The majority of the clerks hold other-
wise, some with hesitance, others vigorously as in the fourth
circuit. 820
Their contention is based chiefly upon Criminal Rules
37 (a) and 39 (a). The former continues the older practice
of requiring the district court clerks to forward immediately
to the appellate court clerks the duplicate notice of appeal
and the statement of the docket entries.83
The latter, Rule 39 (a) provides, among other things, for
supervision and control of the proceedings on appeal in the
82a See Rule 32 of Tenth Circuit, 170 F. (2d) XXIV (1948).
33 One may as an original matter question -the utility of the sending of the
notice of appeal by the district court clerk to the clerk of the circuit court of
appeals. This requirement, apparently meaning little, is but indifferently per-
formed, achieves no affirmative benefit, and raises a problem as to the time of
docketing.
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appellate court from the time that the notice of appeal is
filed with its clerk. These differences do of course create a
problem, and make more difficult a uniform procedure. But
even taking these differences into account, it would seem
that the clerks are practically nullifying Rule 39 (c). Crimi-
nal Rule 39 (a) seems to be merely a somewhat differently
worded provision from Civil Rule 73 (a) which provides that
failure to take other steps after the notice of appeal does
not affect its validity, but is ground only for remedial steps
by the appellate court. The requirement for forwarding the
notice of appeal to the appellate court seems more by way
of general notice than one of actual docketing. To be sure,
a proceeding such as a motion for bail, like a motion to dis-
miss, would seem to require some sort of record, as well as
docketing. But until some affirmative step of that kind is
taken, docketing seems unnecessary and undesirable if not
unfair to a litigant who might not perfect his appeal. If
there be no docketing, he ought to get his twenty-five dollars
back, but could he secure a refund from the United States?
It would seem that the action of the clerks ought to be uni-
form among the circuits as to both civil and criminal prac-
tice. The matter is now in issue because it was raised through
reports to the Committee on Judicial Statistics of the Senior
Circuit Conference. As to time intervals on appeals in the
different circuits, the committee discovered the lack of uni-
formity in docketing when it asked for explanations of the
considerable discrepancy in the figures among the circuits.
Along this same line mention should be made of the slight
difference in Criminal Rule 39 (c) from Civil Rule 73 (g).
Criminal Rule 39 (c) provides for extension of time for filing
and docketing, not only by the district court but also by the
appellate court. Civil Rule 73 (g) provides for such action
only by the district court.84
34 The above difficulties as to Criminal Rules 37 and 39 can be solved imme-
diately by the Supreme Court since these rules and amendments to them need
not be referred to Congress.
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Some federal courts have had difficulty as to amended
Civil Rule 58 for entry of judgment, and its use to determine
definitely the entry of judgment in criminal cases. There
have been several cases involving the question of when a
judgment was actually made on a denial of a motion for new
trial.
Federal Criminal Rule 15 (d) provides: "A deposition
shall be taken in the manner provided in civil actions. The
court at the request of a defendant may direct that a deposi-
tion be taken on written interrogatories in the manner pro-
vided in civil actions." 11 Civil Rule 28 governing persons be-
fore whom depositions may be taken was amended in 1948, so
as to allow depositions to be taken "... . before a person ap-
pointed by the court in which the action is pending. A per-
son so appointed has power to administer oaths and take
testimony." The added language provides for the situation,
occasionally arising, when depositions must be taken in an
isolated place where there is no one readily available who
has the power to administer oaths and take testimony ac-
cording to the terms of the rule as originally stated.36 I
assume that Federal Rule 15 (d) now is based on the
amended Civil Rule 28 (a).
Criminal Rule 23 (c) provides: "In a case tried without
a jury the court shall make a general finding and shall in
addition on request find the facts especially." Civil Rule
52 (a) was amended in 1948 so as to provide that if an
opinion or memorandum of decision is filed, it will be suffi-
cient if the findings of fact appear therein; and that findings
of fact are unnecessary on decisions of certain motions.37
Criminal Rule 36 on clerical mistakes was identically
phrased with Civil Rule 60 (a). Civil Rule 60 (a) was
85 The notes of the Advisory Committee as to this provision state: "The
procedure prescribed is similar to that in civil cases, Rules- 28-31, Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure."
36 See Notes of the Civil Advisory Committee 5 F.RD. 456 (1946).
87 See Advisory Committee Note 5 F.R.D. 471-472 (1946).
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amended in 1948 so as to add the following sentence: "Dur-
ing the pending of an appeal, such mistakes may be so cor-
rected before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court,
and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so cor-
rected with leave of the appellate court." This provision
permits corrections after docketing, with leave of the appel-
late court.8 In civil cases some courts had thought that
upon the taking of an appeal the district court lost its power
to act.
Criminal Rule 45 (c) as to effect of expiration of the term
is substantially the same as the old Civil Rule 6 (c). Civil
Rule 6 (c) was amended in 1948 so as to prevent reliance
upon the continued existence of a term as a source of power
to disturb the finality of a judgment upon grounds other
than those stated in the rules."9
Civil Rule 45 (d) (2) as to subpoena for taking deposition
and place of examination gives the court the same power
in the case of residents of the district as is conferred in the
case of non-residents to fix a place for attendance which may
be more convenient and accessible for the parties than that
specified in the old rule." Perhaps Criminal Rule 17 (f) (2)
should be amended to secure the same effect.
Criminal Rule 58, somewhat resembling Civil Rule 84,
provides that: "The forms contained in the Appendix of
Forms are illustrative and not mandatory." Civil Rule 84
was amended in 1948 so as to provide: "The forms con-
tained in the Appendix of Forms are sufficient under the
rules and are intended to indicate the simplicity and brevity
of statement which the rules contemplate." The amendment
seems to emphasize that the forms are sufficient to with-
stand attack under the rules under which they are drawn,
38 See Advisory Committee Note 5 F.R.D. 477 (1946). This criminal rule can
be amended immediately by the Supreme Court as it need not be referred to Con-
gress.
39 See Advisory Committee Note 5 F.R.D. 437, 439 (1946).
40 See Advisory Committee Note 5 F.R.D. 467, 468 (1946).
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and that the practitioner using them may rely on them to
that extent.4 '
Integration with Titles 18 and 28, United States Code
A number of the Criminal Rules expressly refer to Titles
18 and 28 of the United States Code. 2 Both of these titles
were materially changed on September 1, 1948.11 Some of
the old sections were renumbered, some were transferred
from Title 28 to Title 18, and some were omitted. One read-
ing the Criminal Rules will not therefore in some cases be
directly and accurately referred to the present governing
statutes. I shall take up these instances in detail.4
As I have indicated previously," Section 1825 of Title 28
alters Criminal Rule 17 (d) so as to relieve the United States
of the obligation to tender attendance and mileage fees to
witnesses subpoenaed in its behalf. The reference in Rule
17 (e) (2) as to place of service of subpoena abroad will
henceforth be to 28 U.S.C. sections 1783-1784 instead of to
28 U.S.C. sections 712-714. The reference in Rule 41 (b) (3)
as to the grounds for issuance of a warrant will now be to
41 See Advisory Committee Note 5 F.R.D. 498 (1946).
42 Even more numerous references are made in the Notes of the Advisory
Committee.
43 See Albert B. Maris, J., New Federal Judicial Code: Enactment by 80th
Congress a Notable Gain, 34 A.B.A.J. 863 (1948); Clarence G. Galston, J., An
Introduction to the New Federal Judicial Code, 8 F.R.D. 201 (1948). Judge
Maris informed me that on December 10, 1948, he submitted amendments to the
Rules to the Supreme Court. They were approved on December 27, 1948 .... U.S.
S.Ct ...... 93 L.Ed. 261 (adv.) (1948).
44 But no reference will be made to the changes necessitated in the Notes of
the Advisory Committee. It is of interest that the Supreme Court amended
Rule 38Y2 of its Rules because of a change in 28 U.S.C. § 2101 (c). See 69 Sup. Ct.
IX (1948).
In form 1 the citation will now be to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111, 1114, instead of 18
U.S.C. §§ 452, 53; in form 2 to 18 U.S.C. § 1111 instead of 18 U.S.C. §§ 451,
452; in form 3 to 18 U.S.C. § 1341 instead of 18 U.S.C. § 338; in form 4 to
18 U.S.C. § 2154 instead of 50 U.S.C. § 103; in form 6 to 18 U.S.C. § 2312
instead of 18 U.S.C. § 408; in form 7 to 18 U.S.C. § 2313 instead of 18 U.S.C.
§ 408; in form 8 to 18 U.S.C. § 912 instead of 18 U.S.C. § 76; in form 9 to 18
U.S.C. § 912 instead of 18 U.S.C. § 76; in form 10 to 18 U.S.C. § 287 instead
of 18 U.S.C. § 80; in form 15 to "Under Rule 41" instead of "Under 18 U.S.C.
sec. 287."
45 See footnotes 20-22, supra.
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18 U.S.C. section 957 instead of to 18 U.S.C. section 98.
The reference in Rule 4 (g) on scope and definition with
respect to search and seizure, to 18 U.S.C. sections 611-616,
620, 621, 623-626, is no longer needed as these sections are
omitted in the new Title 18 U.S.C.
The reference-in Rule 54 (b) (2) as to offenses outside a
district or state will now be to 18 U.S.C. section 3238, in-
stead of 28 U.S.C. section 102. The reference in Rule
54 (b) (3) as to peace bonds will now be to 18 U.S.C. sec-
tion 3043 instead of 28 U.S.C. section 392. The reference in
Rule 54 (b) (4) as to trials before commissioners will now
be to 18 U.S.C. sections 3401 and 3402 instead of 18 U.S.C.
sections 576-576 (d).
Rule 54 (b) (1) and all -the forms should be amended to
use the term "United States district courts" instead of "dis-
trict courts of the United States," to conform with the
nomenclature under 28 U.S.C. section 132 (a). To conform
with the same provision the title of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure should be amended to read as follows:
"Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United States District
Courts."
To conform with Title 28 U.S.C. section 43 (a) the word
"circuit" should be removed from Rules 37 (a) (1),
38 (a) (3), 38 (c), 39 (b) (2), 54 (a) (1), 56, 57 (a), and
Form 26.
Rule 54 (a) (1) should be amended to eliminate special
reference to the district courts for the District of Columbia,
Hawaii, and Puerto Rico which are now United States dis-
trict courts for all purposes under 28 U.S.C., sections 88, 91,
-119, 132, 133, and 451; and to eliminate special reference
to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia which
is now a United States court of appeals for all purposes
under 28 U.S.C. sections 41 and 45.
The references in Rule 54 (b) (5) as to proceedings under
the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act should now be made
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specifically to 18 U.S.C. Chapter 403-Juvenile Delin-
quency; and to proceedings against a witness ih a foreign
country should now be to 28 U.S.C. section 1784, instead of
26 U.S.C. sections 711-718.
In the light of changes in the Judicial Code, it would
seem that the three sentences of Criminal Rule 54 (c) re-
ferring to "justices" from the District of Columbia might
be omitted. Justices of the District Court of the District of
Columbia are now called judges, the District of Columbia is
now made a circuit, and the chief justice of the United
States Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia is now
called "chief judge" in common with the former senior cir-
cuit judges of other circuits."
Rule 55 calls for the keeping of records as prescribed by
the Director of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, with the approval of the Judicial Conference
of Senior Circuit Judges. Under the new judicial code the
latter body is to be known as the Judicial Conference of the
United States.4 7
It seems that some of the gaps in Criminal Rule 33 as to
new trial have been filled in by the new Judicial Code.4" As
Judge Parker has pointed out:
Congress has not attempted to take away the right to
make collateral attacks in violation of constitutional rights.
46 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 41, 44 and 45; and Reviser's Notes, U. S. Con CONG.
SERv. (Unbound Title 28, Appendix) 1703-1707, 1735-1736 (1948); Albert B.
Mars, J., New Federal Judicial Code: Enactment by 80th Congress a Notable
Gain, 34 A.B.A.J. 863, 963 (1948).
47 28 U.S.C. § 331.
48 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The Reviser's Notes, U. S. CODE CONG. SEav. (Unbound
Title 28, Appendix) 1908 (1948), state:
"This section restates, clarifies and simplifies the procedure in the nature of
the ancient writ of error coram nobis. It provides an expeditious remedy for
correcting erroneous sentences without resort to habeas corpus. It has the approval
of the Judicial Conference of the United States. Its principal provisions are
incorporated in H.R. 4283, Seventy-ninth Congress."
See also Longsdorf, Habeas Corpus A Protean Writ and Remedy, 8 F.R.D. 179,
191 (1948); Dession, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure II, 56 YATL
L. J. 97, 233-235 (1947); FEEmA. RuLs oF CRnMqAL PROCEDuRE, FnrsT PRE-
r.IMNARY DAPrT 256-258, 260-261 (1943).
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It has provided, however, that when conviction was had in the
federal courts, this right must be asserted by motion before
the sentencing court, and not before another court by applica-
tion for habeas corpus, unless it appears that the remedy by
motion is not adequate. Section 2255 provides that the motion
may be made at any time, where applicant is in custody under
sentence of a federal court and is claiming that the sentence
was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction or
that the sentence was in excess of the maximum allowed by
law, or "otherwise subject to collateral attacks." This motion
is in the nature of an application for a writ of error coram
nobis and is merely declaratory of existing law. The court
before which it is made is authorized to entertain and pass
upon it without requiring the production of the prisoner at
the hearing.49
The last paragraph of this section relates to habeas corpus.
It provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a
prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pur-
suant to this section, shall not be entertained if it appears
that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion,
to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied
him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion
is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.
This section thus requires that the attack upon the judg-
ment of imprisonment be made in the court in which judg-
ment was rendered, where the facts as to the procedure fol-
lowed are known to the court officials and where the prose-
cutor who conducted the case will be available to see that
these facts are adequately presented. Habeas corpus will be
available only when a judge to whom application therefor is
made finds that the remedy by motion is "inadequate or
ineffective to test the legality of the detention."
As a matter of logic and completeness it would seem that
most of the matters covered in the new code provision should
49 John J. Parker, J., Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171,
175 (1948).
The sentencing court need not entertain a second or successive motion.
An appeal may be taken to the Court of Appeals from the order entered on
the motion as from a final judgment on application for a writ of habeas corpus.
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properly be covered in the Criminal Rules. In my opinion
Criminal Rule 33 on new trial o ought to cover not only all
that it now covers but also the relief formerly obtained by
the writ of error coram nobis and most, though possibly not
all the relief formerly obtainable after trial by the writ of
habeas corpus.51
The Supreme Court, however, deleted a provision recom-
mended by th6 Advisory Committee that a motion for a new
trial based "on the ground that the defendant has been de-
prived of a constitutional right may be made at any time
before or after final judgment." 52 The Criminal Rules should
also deal with the possible availability of the writ of error
coram nobis.53 Rule 60 (b) of the amended Civil Rules ex-
pressly abolishes the writ and provides a substitute." Title
28, section 2255 now provides a statutory substitute in crimi-
nal cases.55 The United States Supreme Court in dicta had
twice recently suggested doubt as to its availability in the
federal courts.56 Back in 1943 four members of the Advisory
Committee were unsuccessful in persuading the Advisory
50 Or Rule 33 in combination with Rules 34-36. These changes could be
made by the Supreme Court immediately as they need not be referred to Congress.
51 I am not sure that there are not some cases where habeas corpus should
be retained as to relief after trial, particularly because of the two year limit on
motion for new trial now contained in Rule 33. If that limit were abolished
then I can think of no cases where a writ of habeas corpus after trial would be
essential. Criminal Rule 32 (d) seems to be ample as to pleas of guilty. I do not
deny that habeas corpus will still be useful as to proceedings prior to verdict of
guilty or plea of guilty.
52 FEDERAL RULES OF CRMIN.AL PROCEDURE, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY Com-
nrrEE Rule 35 (1944).
53 Dession, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: II, 56 YALE L. J.
197, 233-235 (1947).
54 See the Advisory Committee Report, 5 F.R.D. 433, 477-480 (1946).
55 See the Reviser's Notes, U. S. CoDE CONG. SERV. (Unbound Title 28) 1908
(1948).
56 "Although this court has reserved decision on whether the federal district
courts are required to entertain proceedings in the nature of coram nobis . . . it
is difficult to conceive of a situation in a federal criminal case today where that
remedy would be necessary or appropriate." Jackson, J., in United States v.
Smith et al., 331 U.S. 469, 475, n. 4, 67 S.Ct. 1330, 91 L.Ed. 1610 (1947).
"It survives in varying forms in state practice but it may be that in federal
practice its purpose is otherwise served." Burton, J., in Taylor v. State of Ala-
bama, 335 U.S. 252, 259, 68 S.Ct. 1415, 1418 (1948).
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Committee to recommend the following rule: "A motion for
a new trial based solely upon the ground of newly discovered
evidence, fraud, duress, or other gross impropriety may be
made at any time before or after final judgment, but if an
appeal is pending the trial court may grant the motion only
on remand of the case." 11 It is not surprising that the new
Judicial Code has attempted to fill in the gap. The present
Criminal Rule 33 is not comprehensive enough as to the
grounds for relief or as to the time limit on such relief."
Henceforth, in some cases a criminal defendant will move
for a new trial under Criminal Rule 33; in others he will
make a motion under 28 U.S.C. section 2255 in the sentenc-
ing court "to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence", and
the court upon the requisite finding "shall discharge the
prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct
the sentence as may appear appropriate." In still others, and
presumably rare cases where the remedy by motion "is inade-
quate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention", he
may apply for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. -sec-
tion 2255, the last paragraph. It may be noted in passing
that 28 U.S.C. section 2255 to some extent overlaps with
Criminal Rule 35 which provides in part: "The court may
correct an illegal sentence at any time."
Rule 7 (b)
Questions of constitutionality and interpretation have
arisen concerning Rule 7 (b) on waiver of indictment. Its
57 See statement of Messrs. Dession, Gleck, Orfield, and Wechsler in THE
FEDERAL RuLEs OF CaNi AL PROCEDURE, FIRST PREL1mwNARY DRArT 256-258
(1943).
In 1947 Justice Jackson stated in a criminal case: "Of course, the federal
courts have power to investigate whether a judgment was obtained by fraud and
make whatever modification is necessary at any time." United States v. Smith
et al., 331 U.S. 469, 475, n. 4, 67 S.Ct. 1330, 1335, 91 L.Ed. 1610 (1947).
58 The rule fixes a two year limit after final judgment as to motions on the
ground of newly discovered evidence. The Advisory Committee had recommended
no time limit. See Orfield, Two Years of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
22 TEMPLE L. QUART. 46, 47-49 (1948); Dession, The New Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure: II, 56 YALE L. J. 197, 232-235 (1947).
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constitutionality was upheld by the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals,59 a district judge of South Carolina,"° and a district
judge of Pennsylvania. 6 No reported decision has held it
unconstitutional.
The major question of interpretation arising concerning
Rule 7 (b) is whether or not an information can be filed
before the waiver of indictment by the defendant. Federal
District Judge Albert V. Bryan of Virginia stated at the
Judicial Conference of the Fourth Circuit on June 26, 1948,
that the practice of a large number of United States Attor-
neys, and probably the view of the Department of Justice
was that an information could not be filed prior to the
waiver. His own view was that the information must be
filed first and the waiver occur later. The United States
Attorney for his district took the opposite view, and a solu-
tion was reached by doing the two simultaneously. If the
information is not filed first, then the defendant is in the
position of being asked whether he waives something which
is not formally of record. By requiring filing of the informa-
tion first, the government is irrevocably put on record of
what its charge will consist. In the event defendant insists
upon an indictment, no harm is done. The information will
simply be filed, remain of record, and be ineffective as the
defendant has not consented.
In my opinion it makes little difference which order of
procedure is used. Possibly Rule 7 (b) should be amended
to make it absolutely clear that the information may be
filed before the waiver as well as afterwards.62
59 Barkman v. Sanford, 162 F. (2d) 592 (C.CA. 5th 1947) noted 21 So.
CAL. L. Rxv. 193 (1948). See also my comment in 21 RocKY MT. L. Izv.
76 (1948).
60 United States v. Martin, 8 F.R.D. 89 (W.D.S.C. 1948).
61 Simones v. Humphrey, 79 F.Supp. 5 (M.D. Pa. 1948).
62 Federal Circuit Judge John J. Parker suggested that either order of pro-
cedure was valid. If the information is filed first, the waiver relates back to the
original finding, hence such procedure is not objectionable.
It was held that the information could be filed before the waiver in United
States v. East, 5 F.R.D. 389, 390 (N.D.Ind. 1946). Swygert, J. stated: "The
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Rule 20
No rule has attracted more discussion than Rule 20. Dur-
ing 1948 it was discussed by the circuit conferences in the
fourth, fifth and ninth circuits. 3 Federal District Judge
James Alger Fee of Oregon held the rule to be unconstitu-
tional in United States v. Bink.64 I have stated elsewhere
my reasons for disagreeing with him.65 The real problems
in my opinion are the proper construction and possible im-
provement of the Rule.
Just as in the case of Rule 7 (b) question has arisen
whether the information may be filed prior to the waiver of
indictment when there are waivers of both indictment and
venue as to pleas of guilty. Judge Bryan stated at the fourth
circuit conference that he would have the information pre-
cede the waiver."6 When the defendant is arrested in a dis-
trict other than that of the commission of the crime and
wishes to plead guilty, if the information has not previously
been filed in the district of the crime, there will be no infor-
mation to show the defendant as it is not of record. The
only data he will have will be what the United States Attor-
ney of the place of arrest orally reveals to him as to the
charge. His attorney cannot advise him as to whether there
is any advantage in insisting upon indictment because he is
last sentence of Rule 7 (a) reads: 'An information may be filed without leave of
court', this, taken together with Rule 20, indicates it was intended that an in-
formation may be filed before the defendant waives in open court his right to
be prosecuted by indictment."
63 I am indebted to Mr. Chief Justice Fred Vinson for a copy of the minutes
of the fourth circuit conference; and to Federal District Judge Robert L. Russell
for a copy of a committee report to the fifth circuit conference. Federal District
Judge Louis E. Goodman of California presented a paper to the ninth circuit
conference entitled Revolutionary Procedure in Criminal Actions, 8 F.R.D. 338
(1948).
64 74 F. Supp. 603 (Ore. 1947). For reference to a similar holding in the
Southern District of California see Fred E. Strine, The New Federal Criminal
Rules in Action, 8 FzD. B. J. 190, 192 (1947).
65 Orfield, The Constitutionality of Rule 20, 34 CoRe. L. Q. 129 (1948).
66 This also appears to be the view of District Judge Robert L. Russell of
Georgia and Ben H. Rice, Jr., of Texas in their committee report on the Federal
Rules to the fifth circuit conference.
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not aware what will be embraced in the information. On the
other hand if the United States Attorney of the place of the
crime filed his information, he could then have it immediately
transferred to the place of arrest and have the defendant
confronted with the information at the time he decides on his
future action. If the defendant finally refuses, all that is
lost is the preparation and typing of the indictment. On the
other hand if he consents, then he waives what amounts to
a definite charge. Furthermore a second exchange of cor-
respondence and of transfers between the two jurisdictions
is saved.
Mr. Bernard Flynn, United States Attorney in Maryland,
in answer to Judge Bryan, pointed out that in Maryland, as
well as in some other Districts the information is filed after
the defendant's waiver of indictment. 7 Since the defendant
is usually brought up on a complaint and a warrant before
the commissioner, the complaint will reveal to him what the
charges are. He may be advised by a copy of a proposed
information. He may be advised by his counsel. He may be
advised in open court by the United States Attorney. His
waiver is not binding unless it is an intelligent waiver. Mr.
George R. Humrickhouse, United States Attorney in Vir-
ginia, has suggested that attached to the waiver and incor-
porated by reference therein there could be a copy of a pro-
posed information. He was opposed to consolidation of
waiver of indictment and consent to transfer, as in some dis-
tricts,68 as Rule 20 specifically provides that the defendant
may consent to transfer only after he has received a copy
of the information.
67 Mr. H. E. Henderson, United States Attorney in North Carolina, stated
that upon inquiry to the Department of Justice he found that the United States
Attorneys were about equally divided as to the proper order of procedure. It is
stated that the majority view is that -the waiver of indictment must precede( the
filing of the information in Strine, The New Federal Criminal Rules in Action,
8 FED. B. J. 190, 194 (1947), although he regards the sequence as unimportant.
68 e.g., North Carolina according to statement by United States Attorney
H. E. Henderson; and Indiana, United States v. East, 5 F.R.D. 389 (N.D.Ind.
1946).
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The committee on the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure of the fifth circuit conference had suggestions to
make only as to Rules 7 (b) and 20. The committee of two
district judges were divided as to the validity of Rule 20.69
They were also dubious as to whether waiver of indictment
can occur in the district of arrest or only in the district of
the crime.70 Since Rule 20 relates to a defendant arrested
in a district other than that in which the indictment is pend-
ing, the rule arguably cannot operate except where an indict-
ment on information is pending. The expression in Rule
7 (b) as to waivers "in open court" arguably refers to
waiver, only in the Court of the place of the crime. The
Committee felt that if waiver of indictment at the place of
arrest is to be permitted the Rule should be clarified ex-
pressly to permit it.
It was pointed out at the ninth circuit conference that the
following procedure is followed in the northern district of
California: " (1) The defendant's written statement must
be filed in open court; 72 (2) prior to signing such statement,
defendant must be represented by counsel unless there is an
intelligent waiver of counsel; 78 (3) before plea the United
States Attorney must first certify to the court that he con-
siders the consent and plea of the defendant to be in the
interest of justice; 74 (4) unless the court is satisfied, it will
make its own investigation as to the defendant's reason for
giving his consent before permitting the plea of guilty to be
69 They were Robert L. Russell of Georgia and Ben H. Rice, Jr., of Texas.
70 Permitting waiver at the place of arrest is advocated by Fred E. Strine.
Strine, The New Federal Criminal Rides in Action, 8 FED. B. J. 190, 194 (1947).
Such waiver was permitted in United States v. East, 9 F.R.D. 389 (N.D.Ind. 1946).
71 Louis E. Goodman, J., Revolutiondry Procedure in Criminal Actions, 8
F.R.D. 338, 341-342 (1948).
72 Rule 20 is silent as to any filing in open court.
78 Rule 20 is silent as to the right to counsel. The Advisory Committee
provided for the right to counsel in only one of its drafts, the First Preliminary
Draft. It was deleted because it was thought it would slow up the process.
74 Rule 20 is silent as to such certification. However, a transfer requires the
approval of the United States Attorney for each district.
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made; " (5) in case a transfer from the place of the crime
to the place of arrest is sought from the California court,
the clerk may not transmit the papers to such other district
until so ordered by the court, and the court will require from
the United States Attorney a certification that such transfer
is not an interference with the administration of justice.76
In my opinion all but the third and fourth of these require-
ments are in conflict with Rule 20, the third and fourth per-
haps being valid under Rule 11.
Perhaps Rule 20 might be amended to make it absolutely
clear that the court of the place of arrest, like the court of
the place of the crime, need not accept a plea of guilty.
Possibly the approval of both judges should be made a requi-
site.7 A United States Attorney has suggested to the De-
partment of Justice that when disposition has been made of
a case transferred under Rule 20, the clerk in the district
of arrest should be required to notify the clerk in the district
where the case arose.7" This should be done in order that
the docket of the case may be completed by an official entry
of the final disposition of the case.
Rule 9 (a)
Federal District Judge Bryan of Virginia has raised a
problem in connection with Rule 9 (a), providing for the
75 Rule 20 is silent as to such investigation. However, under Rule 11 the
court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty.
76 Rule 20 seems to call for transmission by the Clerk, and is silent as to
any order of the court.
77 These two suggestions have come to me from George F. Longsdorf of the
United States Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure. Federal District judge Goodman thought the right of veto of the United
States Attorneys of both districts not an adequate safeguard. Goodman, Revo-
lutionary Procedure in Criminal Actions, 8 F.R.D. 338, 341 (1948).
78 BuLLETIN or THE CamNAL DIVrsIoN o" TnE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
April 5, 1948.
The Judicial Conference of the Second Circuit "voted to ask a recon-
sideration by the Senior Circuit Conference of its refusal to order the recording
of a final judgment in the district where an indictment had been returned, when
trial was had in another district, as permitted under the new Criminal Rules."
33 A.B.A.J. 873, 874 (1947).
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issuance of warrants upon indictments and information.
What happens if the judge is absent from the court at the
time a warrant is desired? Is there any one who can then
issue the warrant? Judge Bryan suggests that perhaps the
commissioner could issue a warrant, but that another possible
answer is that upon the return of the indictment, the court
be allowed to enter a general order directing the clerks to
issue a warrant upon request of the United States Attorney.
He was not certain whether this would have to be entered
on each occasion or whether or not a general or standing
order would suffice. Mr. George R. Humrickhouse, United
States Attorney in Virginia, suggested that the solution is
the issuing of a summons by the clerk on the request of the
prosecution. The above problems, of course, would not have
arisen if the Supreme Court had adopted the suggestion of
the Advisory Committee in all its drafts calling for action
by the clerk.
Rule 15
Possibly Rule 15 on depositions does not go far enough in
enabling defendants to prepare for trial."9 The Civil Rules
authorize examination of witnesses before trial as a normal
routine. Criminal Rule 15 permits examination only of wit-
nesses who "may be unable to attend or prevented from
attending a trial or hearing" 80 or who have been committed
for failure to give bail. In further contrast with the Civil
Rules,8 depositions may be taken only in the discretion of
the court.
With respect to Rule 46 (b) covering bail for witness and
Rule 15 as to depositions by witnesses failing to give bail,
79 See Dession, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: I, 56 YA=da
L.J. 197, 216-217 (1947); ORY=D, CRIZMqAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL
327 (1947).
80 Rule 15 (a).
81 See Civil Rules 26 (a) and 30.
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possibly further protection should be given to the defendant.
Federal Judge Freed states:82
The rule in my personal judgment should be extended to
provide for a hearing in court when the government requests
that bail be fixed for a material witness. If upon a hearing
it should appear to the court that an injustice may result to
a witness. by incarceration upon failure to furnish bail, the
court may order that the witnesses' deposition be taken and
the witness be discharged.
Rule 16
The Civil Rules on discovery enable the parties to prepare
for trial in a most sweeping fashion. As Federal District
Judge Albert A. Ridge of Missouri recently stated in an
address on the amended Civil Rules:"
There are two guiding principles on the subject of dis-
covery under the rules. They are: First, every party to a
litigation is entitled to secure all evidence, information and
documents germane to the issues, even if they are in possession
of the adverse party; Second, such evidence, information and
documents should be made available before the trial. The
purpose of the discovery provisions of the rules is not only
to facilitate the obtaining of evidence for use at the trial,
but also to reduce the element of surprise to a minimum and
to shorten trials.
The First Preliminary Draft of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure had a provision on discovery and inspec-
tion entitling the defendant to an inspection of any relevant
documents or tangible objects "not privileged." 84 The Sec-
ond Preliminary Draft restricted inspection to relevant
82 Freed, J., The Rules of Criminal Procedure: An Appraisal Based on a
Year's Experience, 33 A.B.A.J. 1010, 1012 (1947).
93 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 7 Mo. B. J. 131,
151 (1948). Names "of witnesses or lists of persons having practical information
which are in the possession of the adverse party may be obtained by discovery."
Note, 31 MNN. L. Rxv. 712, 731-732 (1947). See also the view of George Whar-
ton Pepper. Pepper, Discovery Procedure Symposium, 5 F.R.D. 403, 405-406
(1946): "The answers, I think unanimously in the Committee, were, after con-
sidering all the reasons that can be advanced against such an affirmative course,
that it is on the whole just and fair that each shall have the right by interrogating
to elicit from the other the names of the witnesses and their addresses."
84 Rule 19.
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documents on tangible objects "obtained from or belonging
to the defendant or constituting evidence in the proceed-
ing." 85 The rule as adopted restricts inspection to items
"obtained from or belonging to the defendant or obtained
from others by seizure or by process."
Possibly Rule 16 does not go far enough in enabling the
defendant to prepare for trial.86 Federal District Judge
Bryan has pointed out that inasmuch as the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure have changed the trial of a civil case
from a combat of wits to a research for the truth, this pur-
pose is equally desirable in a criminal case. If so, is not the
defendant entitled to a list of the prosecution's witnesses? Is
he not entitled to examine statements that have been pro-
cured? 87 Rule 16 gives the defendant a right only as to
things obtained from or belonging to the defendant or ob-
tained from others by seizure or process. But there are
many things that come in neither of these categories and
yet might be in the possession of the prosecution.88
Federal Judge Freed of Ohio has stated: 9
85 Rule 18.
86 See the excellent discussion by George H. Dession, The New Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure: II, 56 YALE L. J. 179, 215-220 (1947). See also Orfield,
CRIMinAL PROCEDURE rRom ARREST TO APPEAL 328-334 (1947).
87 "A witness' statement made voluntarily and in the possession of the prose-
cution is therefore not subject to inspection, but having been obtained by seizure
or by process. Statements or confessions voluntarily made by co-defendants and
accomplices fall in the same category .... There is no provision in the Rules for
a disclosure by either party of the witnesses to be produced at trial." Dession,
The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: 1I, 56 Y=an L. J. 197, 220 (1947).
88 United States Attorney Bernard Flynn of Maryland agrees that anything
the prosecutor has obtained should be turned over to a defendant for the purpose
of permitting a defendant to make a legitimate honest defense, but not to build
up an alibi. United States Attorney Ben Scott Whaley of South Carolina took
much the same position. United States Attorney George A. Humrickhouse of
Virginia was opposed.
89 The Rules of Criminal Procedure: An Appraisal Based on a Year's Experi-
ence, 33 A.B.A.J. 1010, 1068 (1947). The British rule is very generous to the
defendant. OarsxrL, CaRIMAL PROCEDURE FRO ARREST TO APPEAL 333, n. 265
(1947).
This is one of the rare situations in which the law of Soviet Russia gives
more protection to the defendant. Regarding procedure in the Nuremberg trial,
Mr. justice Jackson stated: "The Soviet delegation objected to our practice on
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I am inclined to the conviction that if steps should be taken
to extend the discovery rules now found in civil procedure to
criminal cases as well, enforcement of criminal law would not
suffer. It probably is true that discovery to its fullest extent
should not be allowed as a matter of right, and should be con-
fined within the limits of the discretion of the Court. But the
confines of the judicial discretion should be bounded by a
showing on the part of the Government that disclosure would
involve the production of a privileged file of some agency,
and that either the substantial rights of the Government will
be jeopardized or that the orderly course of the trial might
be impeded by an order of production.
Rule 21 (b)
Rule 21 (b) provides for transfer of a proceeding as to
an offense committed in two or more districts or divisions.
Federal District Judge McLaughlin of Hawaii has suggested
that this rule needs amendment since the benefits of the rule
may be denied to a defendant "by the simple process of
adding counts to a conspiracy charge which allege addition-
ally certain overt acts as specific offenses." 90 It would ap-
pear, however, that the transfer might have been allowed
by severing the joinder of offenses under Criminal Rule 14.
Judge Coleman of the District Court for Maryland later so
held as to severance of parties.91
the ground that it is not fair to defendants. Under the Soviet system when an
indictment is filed every document and the statement of every witness which
is expected to be used against the defendant must be filed with the court and
made known to the defense. It was objected that under our system the accused
does not know the statements of accusing witnesses nor the documents that may
be used against him, that such evidence is first made known to him at the trial
too late to prepare a defense, and that this tends to make the trial something of
a game instead of a real quest into guilt. It must be admitted that there is
a great deal of truth in this criticism. We reached a compromise by which the
Nuremberg indictment was more informative than in English or American prac-
tice but less so than in Soviet and French practice." Henry Adsit Bull, Nurem-
berg Trial, 7 F.R.D. 175, 178 (1947).
See also Mr. Justice Jackson, Some Problems in Developing an International
Legal System, 22 Tmo. L. Q. 147, 150 (1948).
90 United States v. Hughes Tool Co., 78 F.Supp. 409, 411 (Hawaii 1948).
91 United States v. Erie Basin Metal Products Co., 79 F.Supp. 880, 882
(Md. 1948).
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Rule 32 (c)
With respect to Rule 32 (c), on pre-sentence investiga-
tions, Federal District Judge Coleman of Maryland would
make available to the judge the pre-sentence report before
plea of guilty or conviction. Psychiatric information therein
might be very helpful to the court. He would amend the
rule so as to let the judge have the report if there has been
an indication that the defendant would plead guilty. This
avoids delay in sentencing. Judge Chestnut of Maryland
took the same position. Mr. Henry P. Chandler, Director
of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts,
pointed out in reply that up to conviction the defendant has
the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him
and to have the question of guilt determined only by what
is produced in open court.92 Judge Paul of Virginia sug-
gested that the reports can be amply studied by delaying
sentence eight to ten days.
Conceivably Rule 32 (c) should be amended so as ex-
pressly to confer on the defendant a right to a copy of the
pre-sentence report as soon as he has pleaded guilty or has
been found guilty.9" Federal Judge Bryan of Virginia has
stated that it is the practice in Virginia and probably many
other districts " not to disclose the report to any one except
the court. The defendant may be seriously prejudiced be-
cause the court uses the report in determining the length
of the sentence.95
92 Judge Barksdale of Virginia 'took the same position. See ORrEw, CRIn NAL
PROCEDURE rROm ARREST To APPEAL 547 (1947).
08 The Supreme Court, however, rejected the following sentence proposed by
the Advisory Committee. "After determination of the question of guilt the repoit
shall be available, upon such conditions as the court may impose, to the attorneys
for the parties and to such other persons or agencies having a legitimate interest
therein a the court may designate."
This provision had been intended to serve two purposes: (1) The defense
should have notice and an opportunity to challenge or explain misleading state-
ments in a pre-sentence report, since the report could influence the court's deter-
mination; (2) such reports would furnish useful data for criminological research.
94 This seems to be the practice in Maryland according to United States
Attorney Bernard Flynn.
95 ORPIUD, CRInAINA. PROCEDURE FROm ARREST TO APPEAL 545-546 (1947).
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Rule 38 (c)
On December 10, 1948, Federal Judge Albert B. Maris
submitted to the Supreme Court an amendment to Rule
38 (c) to correct an inadvertent error in the present rule
involving the use of the word "docketing" instead of "filing"
in connection with the record on appeal. He pointed out
that one may find a correct use of these words in Rule
39 (c). 96
Rule 46
With respect to Rule 46 on bail, Federal District Judge
Bryan has raised the question of the power, if any, of the
clerk to take a bail bond in the absence of a session of the
court. Neither the Rules nor the statutes expressly give any
authority to a clerk to take bail at such time. In Virginia
it is a common practice simply to have the defendant appear
before the clerk and give bond.
Forms
With respect to Form 17 entitled "Appearance Bond"
Federal District Judge Bryan of Virginia has suggested that
a provision be inserted that the defendant shall maintain
and keep the peace. Often in determining whether a defend-
ant shall be granted bail it is highly important to make sure
of his good conduct when released on bail. He would have
the bond under seal, as in Maryland and Virginia, because
of the running of statute of limitations as between the surety
and the principal.
With respect to Federal Rule 43 on presence of defendant,
Judge Bryan has suggested that conceivably a change is
needed in the form of the appearance bond. Under Rule 43
the defendant may waive his presence from trial and con-
sent that trial and sentencing proceed in his absence. If he
96 On December 27, 1948, the Supreme Court adopted this amendment and
made it effective January 1, 1949 ..... U.S ..... 69 S.Ct. IX, X (1949).
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is convicted and a fine is imposed and imprisonment ordered,
has his consent satisfied the bond? Or is the bond forfeit-
able if he does not abide the judgment? In the Virginia
practice this situation is taken care of by the additional
condition that is predicated on his answering the judgment
of the court. Mr. D. E. Henderson, United States Attorney
in North Carolina, suggested that in every bond there be
a provision not to depart without leave of court first having
been given.
Lester B. Orfield.
